Abstract-We propose a coalition game model for the problem of communication for omniscience (CO). In this game model, the core contains all achievable rate vectors for CO with sumrate being equal to a given value. Any rate vector in the core distributes the sum-rate among users in a way that makes all users willing to cooperate in CO. We give the necessary and sufficient condition for the core to be nonempty. Based on this condition, we derive the expression of the minimum sum-rate for CO and show that this expression is consistent with the results in multivariate mutual information (MMI) and coded cooperative data exchange (CCDE). We prove that the coalition game model is convex if the sum-rate is no less than the minimal value. In this case, the core is non-empty and a rate vector in the core that allocates the sum-rate among the users in a fair manner can be found by calculating the Shapley value.
I. INTRODUCTION Communication for omniscience (CO) is a problem proposed in [1] . It is assumed that there is a group of users in the system and each of them observes a component of a discrete memoryless multiple source in private. The users can exchange their information in certain way, e.g., communicating over lossless broadcast channels, so as to attain omniscience, the state that each user obtains the total information in the entire multiple source in the system. The CO problem in [1] is based on an asymptotic source model. The coded cooperative data exchange (CCDE) problem proposed in [2] is a special case of the CO problem where the source model is a nonasymptotic finite linear packet one. The non-asymptotic model differs from the asymptotic one in that the communication rates only take integer values. By allowing packet splitting, the CCDE problem has been extended for asymptotic model in [3] , [4] . Independently, the same model has been considered in the closely related secret key agreement (SKA) problem by [5] and is called the finite linear source model.
Determining the minimum sum-rate and finding an optimal rate vector that allocates the minimum sum-rate such that omniscience is achievable are two fundamental problems in CO. The expressions of the minimum sum-rate for asymptotic and non-asymptotic models are derived in [6] based on multivariate mutual information (MMI) for SKA [7] and in [4] for CCDE. It is also shown that an optimal rate vector can be solved * Ni Ding, Rodney A. Kennedy and Parastoo Sadeghi are with the Re- via submodular function minimization (SFM) algorithms in strongly polynomial time, e.g., the algorithms in [3] , [8] based on Edmond's greedy algorithm [9] . However, these works only focus on finding a solution for CO while neglecting the users' motivation to cooperate. For example, the algorithms in [3] , [8] usually output an unfair rate vector which may discourage some users from taking part in CO.
In this paper, we view the CO problem from a coalitional game theoretic perspective. In this game model, each user is assumed to be self-determined in that they can decide whether or not to cooperate and join a certain coalition, a subset of the users. The core of the game is the set of achievable rate vectors with sum-rate being equal to a given value in CO and any rate vector in the core distributes the sum-rate among users in a way that makes all users willing to cooperate in the grand coalition, the entire user set. By using the concepts and related results of submodularity and its base polyhedron [10] , we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the core to be nonempty. We give the expressions of the minimum sum-rate for asymptotic and non-asymptotic models and show that they are in agreement with the results in [4] , [6] . The coalitional game model also addresses another problem in CO: how to allocate the rate fairly to motivate the users to cooperate in asymptotic model. We show that the game is equivalent to a convex game and a fair rate allocation method can be determined by Shapley value if the sum-rate is no less than the minimum value. As compared to the existing method that addresses the fairness in CCDE in [11] , the main advantage of Shapley value is that it can be calculated in a decentralized manner, i.e., it is possible for each user to obtain his/her tuple in Shapley value by him/herself.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Let V be a finte set. We assume that there are |V | > 1 users in the system. Let Z V = (Z i : i ∈ V ) be a vector of discrete random variables indexed by V . For each i ∈ V , user i can privately observe an n-sequence Z n i of the random source Z i that is i.i.d. generated according to the joint distribution P Z V . We allow users exchange their sources directly so as to let all users i ∈ V recover the source sequence Z n V . We consider both asymptotic and non-asymptotic models. In the asymptotic model, we will characterize the asymptotic behavior as the block length n goes to infinity. In non-asymptotic model, the communication rates are required to be integer valued.
Let r V = (r i : i ∈ V ) be a rate vector indexed by V . We call r V an achievable rate vector if omniscience is possible by letting users communicate with the rates designated by r V . Let r be the function associated with r V such that r(X) = i∈X r i , ∀X ⊆ V . For X, Y ⊆ V , let H(Z X ) be the amount of randomness in Z X measured by Shannon entropy [12] and
It is shown in [1] that an achievable rate must satisfy the Slepian-Wolf constraints:
The interpretation of the Slepian-Wolf constraint on X is: To achieve CO, the total amount of information sent from user set X should be at least complementary to total amount of information that is missing in user set V \ X. The set of all achievable rate vectors is
, ∀X ⊂ V } and the minimum sum-rate can be determined by the following linear programming (LP)
We denote the set of optimal rates as
For non-asymptotic model, the achievable rate set is
In CCDE, it is assumed that user i obtains a packet set W {i} that contains finite number of packets each of which belongs to a field F q . The users are geographically close to each other so that they can transmit linear combinations of their packet set via lossless wireless channels to help the others to recover all packets in W V = ∪ i∈V W {i} . In this problem, the value of entropy function H(Z X ) can be obtained by counting the number of packets in W X , i.e., H(Z X ) = |W X | and
and all results derived in this paper hold.
Example II.1. Consider the set V = {1, 2, 3} where 3 users observe respectively
Each W i is an independent uniformly distributed random bit. The users exchange their private observations to achieve the global omniscience of Z V = (W a , . . . , W f ). In this system, the achievable rate set is
III. COALITIONAL GAME We model the system as a coalitional game G(V, α, f α ). In this game, it is assumed that the users can choose to cooperate and form coalitions. A coalition is a group/set of clients that is denoted by X ⊆ V and V is called the grand coalition. Let α ∈ R + . We define the characteristic function for a given value of α as
We call f α (X) the value of coalition X which quantifies the payoff of forming coalition X.
for asymptotic model and C G ∩Z |V | for non-asymptotic model. Let the polyhedron of the characteristic function f α be
The core C G is exactly the base polyhedron of f α :
If we restrict the rate vector r V to satisfy r(X) ≥ f α (X) for some X ⊆ V and the sum-rate r(V ) = α, then we necessarily put constraint
By converting the constraints in B(f α , ≥) in the same way for all X ⊆ V , we get the base polyhedron
B. Interpretation of Core in CO
In CO, B(f # α , ≤) = ∅ means that there exists an achievable rate vector having sum-rate equal to α. The nonemptiness of C G in game G(V, α, f α ) can be interpreted as follows. To achieve CO in V , coalition X must transmit H(Z X |Z V \X ) amount of information. Therefore, it should get payoff that is at least equivalent to its contribution in return. i.e., r(X) ≥ H(Z X |Z V \X ) by denoting r(X) the payoff given to X. Let α be the total amount of payoff. r V with r(V ) = α denotes a method that splits α among the users in V . If C G = ∅, there exists an r V such that all users are willing to cooperate and take part in the CO; Otherwise, no matter how the payoff α is split in V , r(X) ≥ H(Z X |Z V \X ) is breached for at least one X ⊂ V . In this case, user i ∈ X would prefer joining another coalition X ⊂ V such that i ∈ X and r(X ) ≥ H(Z X |Z V \X ) or working as an individual. Either case means the users in X are reluctant to take part in the CO for grand coalition V .
IV. NONEMPTINESS OF CORE
Since the core is not guaranteed to be nonempty in all coalitional games, there is a fundamental question:
(a) When is the core nonempty? If the core is nonempty, we need to answer the question: (b) Can we find a rate vector r V in the core that allocates the value of the grand coalition f α (V ) = α fairly among the users? The main purpose of this section is to answer question (a). We study the submodularity of the base polyhedron of the characteristic function to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core. Question (b) will be answered in Section V.
A. Necessary and Sufficient Condition
Recall that
e., we can study either B(f α , ≥) or B(f # α , ≤) in order to determine the nonemptiness of C G . In this section, we choose to consider B(f # α , ≤) based on which we show that the condition for the nonemptiness of the core can be straightforwardly derived.
Due to the submodularity of the entropy function H, i.e., 
H(X) + H(Y ) ≥ H(X
Proof: 
B. Minimum sum-rate in CO
Theorem (IV.3) can be interpreted by the following corollary.
Corollary IV.4. The core of G(V, α, f α ) is non-empty if α ≥ R CO (Z V ), where
for asymptotic model and
for non-asymptotic model.
Then, the minimum sum-rate must be the minimum value of α such that (9) holds. So, we have (7) for asymptotic model. For non-asymptotic setting, α is the least integer number such that (9) holds. So, we have (8) . According to Theorem IV.3, (7) and (8), we get exactly the minimum sumrate expressions for asymptotic and non-asymptotic models, respectively, for CCDE in [4] . Let I(Z V ) be the MMI measure proposed in [7] that is defined as
If we replace H(Z V \C |Z C ) with the cardinality function
. We can write (7) and (8) as
and
which are exactly the minimum sum-rate for CO for asymptotic and non-asymptotic models, respectively, in [6] , [15] . The interpretation of (10) is as follows. I(Z V ) can be considered as the maximum amount of information that is mutual to users in V [7] . So, the minimum sum-rate for
, the mount of information that is not mutual to users in V . Fig. 3 . B(f # 4 , ≤) for the CO system in Example II.1. In this system, R CO (Z V ) = 4 for non-asymptotic model. Consider game G (V, 4, f 4 ) . (3, 0, 1), (2, 1, 1), (3, 1, 0) }. The Shapley value calculated in Example V.3, which is the gravity center of the core.
Shapley value
We have R * CO (Z V ) ∩ Z 3 = C G ∩ Z 3 = B(f # 4 , ≤) ∩ Z 3 = {
C. Convexity of Game
Convex game is a special class of coalitional game.
Definition IV.6 (Convex Game [16]). A coalitional game is convex if the characteristic function is supermodular.

Convex game has nice properties [17]:
• The core is nonempty; • Shapley value lies in the core. In this section, we use the first property to interpret Corollary IV.4. The second property will be used to present a fair distribution of the value of the grand coalition f α (V ) = α that lies in the core in Section V.
Lemma IV.7. For each α ≥ R CO (Z V ), there exists a convex gameĜ(V, α,f α ) such that the cores of G andĜ are equal.
Proof: The Dilworth truncation of f # α is given by [18] 
We use Lemma IV.7 to interpret Corollary IV.4 as follows. If 
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solved by Edmond's greedy algorithm [9] . Related algorithms can be found in [3] , [8] . These algorithms always find an extreme point (a vertex) of the core. Fig. 3 .
V. SHAPLEY VALUE
To make sure that all users are willing to cooperate, it is not sufficient to just know that the core is nonempty. Since the core is not a singleton in general, some solutions in the core may not be a good choice in terms of fairness. For example, for the CO system in Example II.1 when α = 4, the Edmond's greedy algorithm usually returns a vertex of the core C G = B(f # 4 , ≤), e.g., (3, 0, 1), which is one of the unfairest solutions in C G that may make one or more users unwilling to cooperate. In CCDE, to achieve some degree of fairness in rate allocation can also prevent running out of mobile clients' battery usage.
The authors in [19] , [20] proposed polynomial time algorithms to compute a fair rate vector in core C G for nonasymptotic model in CCDE. The greedy algorithm in [19] is based on SFM. The authors in [20] have shown that a fair rate in the base polyhedron B(f # α , ≤), or the core C G , can be found by solving an M -convex minimization for which there exists a discrete steepest descent algorithm that can search the optimal solution in polynomial time.
Finding a fair rate vector for the asymptotic model is more complex than non-asymptotic one. Although the problem can be easily formulated by a convex minimization problem, e.g., min{ i∈V r 2 i : r V ∈ C G }, where the objective function is defined based on Jain's fairness index [21] , the number of constrains 2 |V | is exponentially growing in |V |. In [11] , the authors build a multi-layer graph model and formulate a convex minimization problem based on it. Although the constraints is not as large as 2 |V | , building new model and deriving constraints based on this model incurs extra complexity. In this section, we show an alternative way to achieve the fairness based on game model G(V, α, f α ): Shapley value. 
The weight factor
We formulated the problem of CO by a coalition game model where the core contained all achievable rate vectors that satisfied the Slepian-Wolf constraints for CO and had sumrate equal to a given value. We showed that the core was a base polyhedron of a submodular or intersecting submodular function. We derived the necessary and sufficient condition for the core to be nonempty, based on which we gave the expression of the minimum sum-rate for CO and showed that they were consistent with the existing results in the literature. We proved that the game was convex when the sum-rate was greater or equal to the minimum sum-rate and showed that a fair rate vector in the core could be obtained by calculating the Shapley value. However, since the complexity of obtaining the Shapley value is exponentially growing, it is worth discussing how to allow users to learn the fair rate vector in the core in polynomial time, which could be one of the direction of research work in the future. 
g(C)
Proof: Theorem 2.6 in [10] gives the necessary and sufficient conditions for B(g, ≤) to be nonempty:
which is equivalent to g(V ) ≥ C∈P g # (C) and g(V ) ≤ C∈P g(C) for all P ∈ Π (V ). The latter can be written as
Due to the intersecting submodularity of g, for all ∅ = X, Y ⊂ V such that X ∩ Y = ∅ and X ∪ Y = V , we have
So, for all C ∈ P where P is some partition in Π (V ), g
Therefore, (14) reduces to g(V ) ≤ C∈P g(C), ∀P ∈ Π (V ), which is equivalent to g(V ) = min P ∈Π(V ) C∈P g(C).
